Herbst P. G. (1999)
On proof, the logic of practice of geometry teaching and the two-column proof format

Proof Newsletter Janvier/Fevrier 1999.

5. Some Claims on the Two-Column Proof Format

© Patricio Herbst

 

Based on observation of current practice of proof writing in high school, I concluded elsewhere (Herbst, 1998, pp. 239, 271) that the two-column proof format works in solidarity with a clear division of the discursive labor of student and teacher. The format affords teachers an implicit criterion to indicate what can be said (hence, it leaves unquestioned the control over epistemic operators such as know, need, can say, etc.). The format makes students accountable for producing an ordered list of "categorical" statements about a given figure, whereas it reserves to the teacher the decision as to whether the produced list of statements constitutes a valid argument.
   Those observations can explain why the two-column proof format may be better adapted to the logic or practice of geometry teaching than other (less regulated) forms of argumentation. From the perspective of the teacher, this format presents an efficient tool to ensure and control the production of an acceptable proof by the student. From the perspective of the student, the format does not make him or her accountable for the construction or the explanation of the geometric objects of knowledge or for the manufacturing of an argument. Instead, it requires him or her to produce empirical observations (*) about the figure at hand.
   The two-column proof format also bounds what can be given to prove in the sense that it shapes the conceptions of what geometry is. Two-column proofs work best within a conception of geometry as the study of figures which have already been constructed and are always constructible. The study of geometry conceived in that way is a descriptive study governed by a general logic that emphasizes the logical connection between factual properties. To be clear, Euclidean geometry is indeed all of that but, necessarily, not just that. The practices unfolded around the two-column proof format seem to discourage a complementary conception of geometry that was central in Euclid's Elements and in the notions of Greek geometry (Caveing, 1990): Geometry is also the study of the conditions that make the figures constructible. In the study of geometry conceived in the latter way, the logical links between statements are pondered with respect to the substantive strength of the links: What makes a proposition valuable is not just that a proof exists but also that without a proof one cannot really know whether the assertion is true (because there is such a leap from the hypothesis to the conclusion). As the practice of two-column proofs needs a given figure and given statements of what is given and what is to prove, the conception of geometry as the study of necessary and sufficient conditions is deemphasized (and one can understand why students may proceed by trial and error in construction problems after having proved a statement that entails the construction procedure&emdash;see Schoenfeld, 1988).
   The two-column proof format bounds the conception of mathematical proof and of proving in mathematics. By separating the source of the statements that are formulated from the arguments that are made about them, this format emphasizes the role of proof as a certification method, separated from the search for knowledge or the construction of the mathematical objects of knowledge. By displacing the statement from the proof and enabling a policing of the statements that make up a proof, the two-column proof format breaks the dialectic between formulation and validation described by Lakatos (1976; see also Balacheff, 1991) and its underlying tension between interest to know and validity of knowledge (*).
   As a consequence of the previous observations, it can also be argued that the practices associated with the two-column proof format bypass the epistemological characteristics of mathematical reasoning. These practices foster a reduction of mathematical reasoning to an activity involving the psychology of the reasoning agents and the "natural" language with which they relate to a "given" mathematical world: Mathematical reasoning becomes just (general) logical reasoning applied to mathematical objects, whose conditions of existence are taken as given. Of course, mathematical reasoning certainly involves logical reasoning, yet what is problematic is the exclusion of an epistemological aspect specific to the mathematical objects being reasoned with and about. By identifying the logical precedence of "reasons" with their temporal precedence in the text being studied, mathematical reasoning becomes more of an activity of describing a "given" mathematical world than one of constructing a "possible" mathematical world (or mathematizing). Some consequences as to the value of mathematics in general education and to the nature of the transfer (of the study of mathematics to other situations) can be envisioned (see Judd, 1928; Skovsmose, 1992; Vygotsky, 1934/1986, pp. 146-209): Mathematical reasoning becomes suitable to reason about objects that are purely mathematical or that have already been mathematized elsewhere (such as the objects of the hard sciences), but is hardly deemed apt to reason about other objects (such as those of the soft sciences or ordinary life) beyond the level of appearances. By fostering the notion of proof as just logical reasoning about objects that are already mathematical, the two-column proof format collaborates to stop the scientific dialectic between empiricism and rationalism in the construction of mathematical objects of discourse (see Skovsmose, 1992, p. 6).

 

Note

1. Obviously, the activity of the student can be one of making empirical observations even if no physical interaction with the figure is involved: The observations that can be made are empirical insofar as they assume an identity between material and mathematical object. [Back]

2. A good image of this tension is provided by the rational decision to circumscribe the definition of polyhedron to having faces that are simple (i.e., polygons homeomorphic to circles) so as to achieve a generalization of Euler's theorem based on the number of holes in the polyhedra (see Lakatos, 1976, p. 66ff). [Back]